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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FOURTH

AMENDMENT-USE

OF

DEADLY

To SEIZE FLEEING FELONY SUSPECTS-Tennessee v. Garner-In Tennessee v. Garner,' the Supreme Court held that the
Tennessee statute2 authorizing a police officer to use deadly
force to arrest a fleeing felony suspect was unconstitutional
under the fourth amendment. This decision rendered unconstitutional all statutes with provisions similar to the Tennessee
statute's. At the time of the decision nineteen states had such
statutes.' Eighteen other states allowed for the use of deadly
force if the fleeing suspect had committed a felony involving the
use or threat of physical or deadly force, was escaping with a
deadly weapon, or was likely to inflict serious physical injury if
not arrested.4 The Court determined that "apprehension by use
FORCE

1. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982) [hereinafter "Tennessee statute"]. The statute
reads: "Resistance to officer. If, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he
either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the
arrest."
3. 471 U.S. at 14-15. State statutes which authorize the use of deadly force to seize a
fleeing felony suspect are:
Ala. Code § 13A-3-27 (1982); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-510 (1977); Cal. Penal Code
Ann. g 196 (West 1970); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-22 (1972); Fla. Stat. § 776.05
(1983); Idaho Code § 19-610 (1979); Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3 (1982); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 21-3215 (1981); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-15(d) (Supp. 1984); Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 563.046 (1979); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.140 (1983); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-6
(1984); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 732 (1981); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-9 (1981); S.D.
Codified Laws §§22-16-32, -33 (1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982); Wash.
Rev. Code § 9A.16.040(3) (1977). Oregon limits use of deadly force to violent
felons, but also allows its use against any felon if "necessary." Ore. Rev. Stat. §
161.239 (1983). Wisconsin's statute is ambiguous, but should probably be added
to this list. Wis. Stat. § 939.45(4) (1981-1982) (officer may use force necessary for
"a reasonable accomplishment of a lawful arrest").
Id. at 16 n.14.
4. 471 U.S. at 16. The following statutes were cited by the Court:
Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.81.370(a) (1983); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-410
(1978); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-707 (1978); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11,1§ 467 (1979)
(felony involving physical force and a substantial risk that the suspect will cause
death or serious bodily injury or will never be recaptured); Ga. Code § 16-3-21(a)
(1984); I1. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 7-5 (1984); Iowa Code § 804.8 (1983) (suspect has
used or threatened deadly force in commission of a felony, or would use deadly
force if not caught); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.090 (1984) (suspect committed felony
involving use or threat of physical force likely to cause death or serious injury,
and is likely to endanger life unless apprehended without delay); Me. Rev. Stat.
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of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment,"'5 just as preventing a person
from walking away is a seizure. Conversely, the Court found
that the use of deadly force was not unconstitutional when an
officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a serious physical threat to the officer or others.7 Thus, the Tennessee statute which authorized the use of deadly force against a
fleeing suspect who was neither armed nor dangerous was
8
unconstitutional.
Edward Eugene Garner, the fifteen-year-old son of the respondent-appellee in Garner, was fatally shot in the head by
Memphis Police Officer Elton Hymon.9 Officer Hymon and his
partner Leslie Wright had responded to a burglary-in-progress
call and encountered Garner, a young, unarmed, black male,
crouching in the backyard of the unoccupied dwelling he had
broken into. 10
When Officers Hymon and Wright reached the scene they
found the complainant standing on her porch pointing to the
house next door.1" Hymon remained in the car while Wright
walked to the porch to talk to the complainant.1 2 Hymon opened
the car door to listen to the exchange. 3 The complainant stated
that she heard glass breaking, and that "somebody" or "they"
were breaking into the house next door.' Hymon did not interpret her use of the plural form "they," or other language she
used, as implying that the complainant had any knowledge that
Ann. tit. 17-A, § 107(1983) (commentary notes that deadly force may be used
only "where the person to be arrested poses a threat to human life"); Minn. Stat.
§ 609.066 (1984); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:5(11) (Supp. 1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2C-3-7 (West 1982); N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-401 (1983); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-07.2.d (1976); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 18, § 508 (Purdon); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51(c) (1974); Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-404 (1978).
Id. at 17 n. 18.
5. 471 U.S. at 7.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 11.
8. Id. at 12.
9. Id. at 4.
10. Id. at 3.
11. Brief for Respondents at 3, Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
12. Id. at 2-3.

13. Id. at 3.
14. 471 U.S. at 3.
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more than one person was involved in the break-in .11
Wright radioed the dispatcher to report their arrival at the
scene while Hymon, with his revolver drawn, 6 went around the
side of the house. 17 Wright surveyed the opposite side of the
house. 18 Hymon reached the backyard, heard a door slam, and
saw the suspect run from the back of the house,'" across the
backyard.2 The suspect, Edward Garner, stopped at a six-foothigh chain-link fence. 2 ' With the aid of his flashlight Hymon
found Garner crouching by the fence about thirty to forty feet
away from him. 2 He surmised that Garner was 17 or 18 years
old, and approximately 5'5" or 5'7" tall. 3 He testified that he
'2 4
was "reasonably sure that the individual was not armed.
While directing the flashlight beam on Garner, Hymon identified himself and ordered Garner to halt.25 Hymon paused momentarily, continuing to aim his revolver at Garner26 and then
advanced a few steps toward the suspect.2 7 There was a three15. Brief for Respondents at 3, Garner,471 U.S. 1.
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 471 U.S. at 3. The owner of the house testified that no lights were on in the
house, but that a back door light was on. Officer Hymon, though uncertain, stated in his
deposition that there were lights on in the house. Id. at 3 n.1.
21. Id.
22. Brief for Respondents at 4, Garner,471 U.S. 1.
23. 471 U.S. at 3-4. Garner was in fact fifteen years old. He was 5'4" tall and weighed
about 100 or 110 pounds. Id. at 4 n.2.
24. Brief for Respondents at 5 n.3, Garner,471 U.S. 1. Hymon's conclusion that Garner was unarmed was based on several objective facts. Hymon noted that "had he been
armed, I assume that he would have attempted to show that by firing a weapon, or I
assume that he would have thrown it down, or I assume that Iwould have seen it." Id.
He went on to explain: "I figured, well, if he is armed I'm standing out in the light and
all of the light is on me then I assume he would have made some kind of attempt to
defend himself...." Id.
This conclusion is also corroborated by Hymon's actions. He did not warn his partner that the suspect might be armed, something he "definitely" would have done "if he
had any question about whether this person was armed." Id. He did not fear for his
personal safety either. Otherwise, as he admitted, "I would have taken more cover than
what I had." Rather, he knowingly remained in a position where "all of the light is on
me" and where he was a superior target. Id.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Appellee's Brief at 6, Garner, 471 U.S. 1.
27. 471 U.S. at 4.
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foot chicken-wire fence between Hymon and Garner,18 and
Hymon testified that there was also a clothesline between himself and the suspect.2 9 During the moment Hymon paused after
ordering Garner to halt, the young man bolted from his
crouched position, attempting to scale and jump over the chainlink fence.30 Garner had half of his body over the top of the
fence 1 when Hymon fired, striking Garner in the head.32 Mortally wounded, Garner later died on an operating table. 3 Hymon
subsequently explained that he decided to shoot because he was
certain that once over the fence Garner would escape capture. 4
No one was home when Garner broke into the dwelling.3 5
Ten dollars and a purse taken from the house were found on
Garner after the shooting.3 6 The owner of the house testified
that the purse and ten dollars belonged to his wife, and that a
ring was missing.37 The ring was never recovered.3 8
28.

Brief for Respondents at 6-7, Garner,471 U.S. 1. Hymon later testified that after

shooting Garner he stepped over the chicken wire fence with no problem. Id. at 7.
29. Id. When asked how long it took him to get from the side of the house to the
fence where Garner was, Hymon testified that it did not take him long, and it was "just a
matter of ducking and moving around." Id.
30. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Garner, 471 U.S. 1.
Several record facts bear on Garner's attempt to escape. First, Garner had
prior brushes with the law that, although minor, had been the occasion for discipline by his parents. At the age of 12, he and two other boys illegally entered the
house in whose yard they were playing. He was placed on probation for one year,
and counseled and chastised by his father. In June of 1974, he took a jar of
pennies from a neighbor's house. Although the neighbor refused to call the police because the incident was so minor, the Garner family insisted and called the
police themselves.
Brief for Respondents at 8 n.5, Garner, 471 U.S. 1.
On the night of his death, Edward Eugene Garner's judgment was further impaired
because he had been drinking. "The medical examiner testified that fifteen-year-old Garner had a blood alcohol content of .09%, just .01% under the level set by Tennessee law
as creating a presumption of intoxication for adults." Id.
31. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Garner, 471 U.S. 1.
32. 471 U.S. at 1.
33. Id.
34. Id. When asked at trial why he shot Garner, Hymon replied that he felt it was the
only way he could seize the suspect, considering the unfamiliar neighborhood and terrain, and that the clutter in the back yard hindered him from quickly reaching Garner.
He also noted that he did not think that he could climb the chain-link fence. Brief for
Petitioners at 3, Garner, 471 U.S. 1. See also supra notes 24, and 28.
35. Brief for Respondents at 9, Garner, 471 U.S. 1.
36. 471 U.S. at 4.
37. Id. at 4 n.4.
38. Id.
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Officer Hymon's use of deadly force to prevent the escape of
Edward Garner was authorized by Tennessee statute and Memphis Police Department policy. 9 The statute provides in pertinent part that, "if, after notice of intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the
necessary means to effect the arrest."40 While Police Department policy was slightly more restrictive than the statute, it allowed for the use of deadly force in the case of burglary.41
The shooting incident was reviewed by the Memphis PoliceFirearms Review Board and presented to a grand jury, but
neither body took any action."2
Edward Garner's father, Cleamtee Garner, brought a wrongful death action in the Federal District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee against Elton Hymon for violating his
son's constitutional rights.48 The Memphis Police Department,
its Director, and the Mayor of the City of Memphis were added
as defendants on the grounds that "their failure to exercise due
care in hiring, training and supervision of defendant Hymon
made them equally responsible for Garner's death." '
Garner sought damages for alleged violation of his son's
rights under the fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth
amendments of the Constitution. 4 The fourth amendment4 6 was
39.

Id. at 4.

40.

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 40-7-108 (1982).

41. 471 U.S. at 5.
42. Id. Respondent notes that Memphis Police Department data reveals that
there are significant disparities in the use of deadly force based on the race of
the shooting victim/suspect and that virtually all of this disparity occurs as the
result of the Memphis policy that allows officers to exercise their discretion to
shoot fleeing property crime suspects. Between 1969 and 1976, blacks constituted 70.6" Vof those arrested for property crimes in Memphis, but 88.4% of the
property crime suspects shot at by the Memphis police. In contrast, the percentage of black violent crime suspects shot at by Memphis police was closely proportionate to their percentage in the violent crime arrest population: 85.4% and
83.1 ', respectively .... Of the blacks shot, 50% were unarmed and nonassaultive, 23.1 ( assaultive, but not armed with a gun, 26.9% assaultive and armed
with a gun. Of the whites shot, only one (12.5%) was nonassaultive, two (25%)
were assaultive, but not armed with a gun, and five (62.5%) were armed with a
gun.
Brief for Respondents at 23-25, Garner, 471 U.S. 1.
43. Brief for the Petitioners at 4, Garner, 471 U.S. 1.
44. Id.
45. 471 U.S. at 5.
46. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons. . .against unreasonable
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allegedly violated because Edward Garner was subjected to an
unreasonable search and seizure. The fifth amendment 47 was allegedly violated because Edward Garner was deprived of life
without due process of law. The sixth amendment48 was allegedly violated because Edward Garner was denied the right to a
speedy trial. The eighth amendment 49 was allegedly violated because use of deadly force against an unarmed fleeing felony suspect is cruel and unusual punishment. The fourteenth amendment5" was allegedly violated because the State of Tennessee, by
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108, deprived Edward Garner of life
without due process of law.
A three-day bench trial was held. 5' The district court found
in favor of all defendants on all the issues.52 Specifically, it entered judgment for the Mayor of the City of Memphis and the
Director of the Memphis Police Department 3 dismissing the
claims against them for lack of evidence.5 4 With respect to Officer Hymon, the district court found that he had acted under
the Tennessee statute, which was constitutional. 5 The court rea-

soned that because Garner had "recklessly and heedlessly attempted to vault over the fence to escape, [he] thereby assum[ed] the risk of being fired upon." 56 The district court's logic
was apparently similar to Hymon's: it concluded that use of
deadly force was the only reasonable and practicable means
available to prevent Garner's escape,57 thus implying that the
searches and seizures, shall not be violated..." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

47. "No person shall be ...

deprived of life.

.

.without due process of law.

U.S.

CONST. amend. V.

48. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed. . .and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation . . .
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

49. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

50. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
51. 471 U.S. at 5.
52. Id.
53. Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Garner, 471 U.S. 1.
54. 471 U.S. at 5.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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use of deadly force was justified by the state's interest in apprehending suspected felons.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision with respect to Officer Hymon, finding that
he had acted in good-faith reliance on the Tennessee statute."
The court remanded for consideration of the possible liability of the City of Memphis in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services. 9 It also directed the district court to consider whether "a
municipality's use of deadly force under Tennessee law to capture allegedly nonviolent felons fleeing from nonviolent crimes
[is] constitutionally permissible under the fourth, sixth, eighth
and fourteenth amendments."'
On remand, the district court entered an order in favor of
the City of Memphis and determined that Tennessee Code Ann.
§ 40-7-108 did not violate either the cruel and unusual punishment prohibitions of the eighth amendment or the due process
provisions of the fourteenth amendment. 1 On appeal the Court
of Appeals reversed and again remanded.2
The Sixth Circuit concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7108 was unconstitutionally violative of the fourth and fourteenth
amendments because under the fourth amendment the killing of
a fleeing suspect was a "seizure," and thus constitutional only if
58. Id. Garner v. Memphis Police Dept., 600 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1979).
59. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Under a Monell analysis the district court was directed to
consider whether the city enjoyed qualified immunity, and whether the use of deadly
force in the circumstances at issue was constitutional, or whether unconstitutional municipal conduct flowed from police policy and custom. 105 S. Ct. at 1698. In Monell,
where petitioners brought a class action suit against, inter alia, the Department of Social
Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York, 436 U.S. at 660, the Court
held, inter alia, that municipalities could not arrange their affairs on an assumption that
they can violate constitutional rights for an indefinite period, Id. at 700, and accordingly,
municipalities have no reliance interest that would support an absolute immunity. Id. at
701.
60. 60 F.2d 52, 55 (6th Cir. 1979).
61. 471 U.S. at 6. In this regard, the court declined to answer the "policy or custom"
question of MoneU. Id.
See also Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Tenn. 1971) (with regard to TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108, the court concluded that the use of force in the
arrest of a fleeing felon does not constitute "punishment" nor is the statute vague in its
terms so as to violate due process requirements nor is its distinction between misdemeanants and felons violative of the equal protection clause).
62. 710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983).
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reasonable. 3 Under the facts in Garner, such a "seizure" was
not reasonable and the use of deadly force under the fourth
amendment was not justified." The court reasoned that officers
cannot resort to deadly force unless they "have probable
cause.

. .

to believe that the suspect [has committed a felony

and] poses a threat to the safety of the officers or a danger to
the community if left at large."66 The court of appeals found
that the Tennessee statute authorized the "unnecessarily severe
and excessive, and therefore unreasonable," use of deadly force
to effect the "arrest" of an unarmed, nonviolent, fleeing felony
suspect such as petitioner Garner's son. 6
Pursuant to federal judicial procedure, 7 the State of Tennessee filed a motion to intervene in the case to defend the constitutionality of the Tennessee statute.6 8 The City of Memphis
filed a petition for certiorari.6 " The Supreme Court noted proba70
ble jurisdiction and granted the petition for certiorari.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit, and remanded the case.7 1 The majority held that the Tennessee statute was in violation of the fourth amendment insofar
as it gave Officer Hymon authority to use deadly force against
an unarmed, nonviolent, fleeing felony suspect.72 The Court
adopted the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit and found that the
appropriate standard to determine whether the manner of a
seizure was reasonable is to balance an individual's right to be
secure from unreasonable searches and seizures against the
state's interest in effective law enforcement. 3 It concluded that
Garner's right to be secure from unreasonable seizure constitutionally outweighed the interest of the state.7
63. Id. at 246.
64. Id.
65. 471 U.S. at 6 (quoting 710 F.2d at 246).
66. 710 F.2d at 241.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2043(b).
68. Brief for Petitioners at 5, Garner,471 U.S. 1.
69. 471 U.S. at 7.
70. 465 U.S. 1098 (1984).
71 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
72. Id. at 11.
73. Id. at 21.
74. Id. at 11.
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BACKGROUND: PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Tennessee Code Ann. § 40-7-108 has been interpreted by
Tennessee courts as a codification of the common-law rule permitting law enforcement officers to use deadly force to seize fleeing felony suspects in order to minimize the risk of such suspects' escape.75 The statute allows the use of deadly force only if
a police officer has probable cause to believe that a person has
committed a felony, the officer warns the person that he intends
to seize him, and the officer reasonably believes that no means
less drastic than the use of such force will prevent the escape. 7 a
The statute has been held to be constitutional because the
use of deadly force to seize a fleeing felon is not a "punishment,"
nor is the statute so vague in its terms as to violate due process
requirements.7 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that the statute is not unconstitutional by virtue of a racially
disproportionate impact,7 8 and that 7no
racial bias has been
9
shown to animate the statute's policy.

In Garner, the Supreme Court determined that apprehension by use of deadly force is a seizure, thus subject to the fourth
amendment's reasonableness requirement. 80 The Court recog-

nized that it is not always clear when forms of police interference become a seizure, 8 but noted that when a police officer
prohibits a person from walking away, he or she has seized the
82

person.

The Court made a distinction between police seizure of an
individual, and arrest, noting that an officer may arrest a person
only when he or she has probable cause to believe that the sus75 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982). See, e.g., Love v. Bass, 145 Tenn. 522, 238
S.W. 94 (1921) (where an automobile driver had committed the felony of assault with
intent to kill, by attempting to run down the sheriff when the latter sought to make a
lawful arrest, the sheriff was justified in killing such driver, if necessary to prevent his
escape).
76. Id. Although the statute does not explicitly say so, Tennessee law forbids the use
of deadly force in the arrest of a misdemeanant. Johnson v. State, 173 Tenn. 134, 114
S.W.2d 819 (1938).
77. Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072, 1075-76 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
78. Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
822 (1977).

79. Id. at 1254. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
80. 471 U.S. at 7.
81. Id.. (citing U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)).
82. Id. (citing U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
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pect has committed a crime.83 This principle is central to the
fourth amendment's concern with balancing the right of an apprehended suspect to be secure in his or her person from unreasonable searches and seizures, against the state's interest in ef8
fective law enforcement. 4
It noted appellant's argument that when the probable cause

requirement is satisfied, the fourth amendment is silent as to
how the seizure is made.8 5 Such contention, however, did not

persuade the Court because it did not take into account the
many cases which examine the reasonableness of the manner of

seizure by balancing the nature of intrusion of the individual's
fourth amendment rights against the importance of the government's interests alleged to justify the intrusion.8
83. 471 U.S. at 7.
84. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). In Watson the Court held that
where postal officers have probable cause to believe that a suspect is in possession of
stolen credit cards and search his car without securing a search warrant, the fourth
amendment is not violated. Id. at 423-24. Probable cause was found because the postal
officer was informed by a "reliable" informant that the respondent Watson was in possession of stolen credit cards, id. at 412, 415, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. Id. at 413
n.2. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which ruled that the
fourth amendment prohibited use of evidence of the stolen cards found in Watson's car
as evidence because, notwithstanding probable cause for the arrest, the postal officer
acted without an arrest warrant, though he had had time to secure one. 504 F.2d 849
(1974).
The Supreme Court reasoned that Watson's arrest without warrant was valid because the postal inspector had acted under statutory authority, 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3),
which specifically enables postal officers "performing duties related to the inspection of
postal matters" to "make arrests without warrant for felonies .. " and that notwithstanding the fourth amendment, the statute "represents a judgment by Congress that it
is not unreasonable under the fourth amendment for postal inspectors to arrest without
a warrant provided they have probable cause to do so." 423 U.S. at 415. The Court found
that the authorization of felony arrests based on probable cause,'without warrant, id, at
412, is a principle Congress has directed its law enforcement officials to follow for many
years. Id. at 423.
It argued that rather than encumber criminal prosecutions 'with endless litigation with
respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a
warrant, whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like," id. at 423-24, state and
federal law has long authorized arrest without warrant on probable cause. Id. at 423.
85. 471 U.S. at 7.
86. Id. So, for example, the Court held in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983),
that a prolonged detention of an individual's luggage by police was unreasonable because
the state's interest in prohibiting the flow of narcotics was outweighed by the individual's interest in being secure from unreasonable seizures, the practical effect of the luggage detention. Id. at 709. The Court determined that seizure of the luggage was unreasonable because drug enforcement agents detained respondent's luggage for ninety
minutes and failed to accurately inform him of the whereabouts of the luggage the length
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In determining the weight of the respondent's interest vis-Avis the state's interest, the Court considered the fact that the
seizure was unsupported by probable cause. Generally, a
seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause. 8
The Supreme Court considered the nature of police intrusion and its justification in Michigan v. Summers. 9 In that case
the police had obtained a warrant to search the respondent's
premises for narcotics, and detained respondent in his home
during the search.90 The detention was held to be justified because a search for narcotics can give rise to sudden violence or
efforts to destroy evidence by occupants of premises.9 1 In addition, the nature of the "articulable" suspicion which led to the
detention in Summers was substantial and clear, since the police
had a search warrant issued by a judicial officer with probable
cause to believe that criminal activity was taking place at the
premises." Moreover, the respondent's presence in the premises
gave the police an actual basis for determining that criminal activity was taking place. 3 Considering these factors the Court in
Summers could not find that the seizure of the respondent at his
dwelling, which the police had a warrant to search, violated his
of the detention and resulting period respondent might be dispossessed, and what arrangements would be made for the return of the luggage if suspicion was dispelled by
investigation. Id. at 710.
Against strong governmental interst in drug enforcement, the Court considered the
nature and extent of the intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment rights. Id. at
705. When an officer reasonably believes that a traveler is carrying narcotics in his or her
luggage, the officer may inspect the luggage briefly to investigate the aroused suspicion.
Id. at 706. Nevertheless, such a seizure of an individual's property, while not technically
impinging upon his or her liberty, effectively restrains the person by disrupting travel
plans to remain with the luggage. Id. at 708. Hence, the Court concluded, police seizure
of a person's luggage should closely follow limitations applicable to investigative detention of persons. In this regard, the Court noted that it has never found constitutional a
prolonged ninety minute detention of a person under the facts presented. Id. at 709-710.
See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). There the Court held that the
state's interest in discretionary traffic spot checks as a means of ensuring safety on its
roadways did not outweigh the resulting intrusion on the privacy and security of persons
detained.
87. 471 U.S. at 7.
88. Id.
89. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
90. Id. at 693.
91. Id. at 702.
92. Id. at 703.
93. Id. at 703-04.
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right to be secure from unreasonable seizures guaranteed by the
94
fourth amendment.

The standard of reasonableness was scrutinized with regard
to "stop and frisk" seizures in Terry v. Ohio." The Court held
that where a police officer has reason to believe that his or her
safety or the safety of others is in jeopardy, he may make a reasonable search for weapons on an individual's person regardless
of the lack of probable cause to arrest the individual for a
crime. In examining whether the search and seizure was reasonable, the Court found a search warrant unnecessary, arguing
that securing a warrant is not practical where swift action based
97
upon on-the-spot observations by a police officer is required.
The reasonableness of a search and seizure depends on the "reasonable man" rule: with regard to the particular circumstances,
was the officer justified in suspecting that the individual under
observation was armed? 98 If the officer's suspicions were justified, and the officer had some articulable basis for conducting
the "stop and frisk," the officer may take necessary steps to discover whether the suspected individual is carrying weapons. 9
The Terry Court concluded that in light of the officer's determination that the suspect's and his companions' actions were consistent with the theory that they were contemplating a robbery,
and the fact that his search was deemed by the Court to be confined to what was minimally necessary to determine whether the
94. Id. at 705. See also United State's v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975). In Ortiz, the issue
of reasonableness of searches at traffic check points focused on whether such searches
were based on probable cause. The Court held that such traffic checkpoints removed
from the border were unreasonable, and prohibited by the fourth amendment. In the
absence of probable cause, based on a rasonable belief that the law is being violated,
police discretion to search private vehicles at such checkpoints is not constitutional.
Probable cause in Ortiz would:
include the number of persons in the vehicle, the appearance and behavior
of the driver and passengers, their inability to speak English, the responses they
give to officers' questions, the nature of the vehicle, and indications that it may
be heavily loaded . . . In this case, however, the officers advanced no special
reasons for believing respondent's vehicle contained aliens.
Id. at 897-98.
95. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court found stop and frisk seizures within the purview of
the fourth amendment. Id. at 16.

96. Id. at 22-26.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 24.
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suspects were armed,1 00 the "stop and frisk" search was reasonable under the fourth amendment.
The foregoing cases demonstrate that in conflicts between
individuals and governments over search and seizure principles
of the fourth amendment the Supreme Court will closely consider the totality of the circumstances, hich may or may not justify a particular sort of search and seizure.10 1 Notwithstanding
evidence of probable cause, a police officer may not always seize
a suspect, particularly when the seizure involves use of deadly
force. "The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is
unmatched."' 10 Although recognizing the state's interest in effecting arrests, and the difficulty entailed when the suspect is a
fleeing felon, the Garner majority was not convinced that use of
10 3
deadly force was a productive means of achieving these goals.
The Tennessee statute was held unconstitutional because it
authorized Police Officer Hymon to use deadly force against a
nonviolent fleeing suspect.'10 The majority reasoned that the
statute would pass constitutional muster if it authorized use of
deadly force only "where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm,
either to the officer or to others."' 0 5 A balancing of the suspect's
and the state's interests lead the majority to find that "[w]here
the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no
100. Id. at 28.
101. 471 U.S. at 8. Cases where the Government's interest did not support the seizure
include: United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)(an airport seizure of luggage suspected of containing narcotics was held in violation of its owner's fourth amendment
rights because the seizure entailed detaining the owner for a prolonged period); Winston
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985)(proposed surgery to gather firearm evidence of a robbery
would violate the suspect's right to be secure in his person from unreasonable searches
and seizures); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969)(detention for the sole purpose of
obtaining fingerprints is subject to fourth amendment constraints).
Cases where the Government's interests did support the seizure include: Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973)(evidence discovered from the taking of samples of the suspect's fingernails during the course of voluntary police station-house questioning, later
used to convict the suspect of murder, was not violative of the fourth and fourteenth
amendments); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)(the state may, over the suspect's protests, have a physician extract blood from a person suspected of driving while
intoxicated without violating the suspect's constitutitonal rights).
102. Id. at 9.
103. Id. at 11.
104. See supra note 24. Officer Hymon determined that the suspect was non-violent.
105. 471 U.S. at 11-12.
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threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend
him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so."' 'O
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND COMMON LAW

The Court considered appellant's assertion that the fourth
amendment must be interpreted in accordance with the common
law doctrine that authorizes the use of whatever force is necessary to arrest a fleeing individual suspected of a felony, but prohibits the use of such force against one suspected of only a misdemeanor.10 7 The doctrine was articulated in Hale's writing as
published in Pleas of the Crown:
If persons that are pursued by these officers for felony or
the just suspicion thereof. . .shall not yield themselves to
these officers, but shall either resist or fly before they are
apprehended or being apprehended shall rescue themselves and resist or fly, so that they cannot be otherwise
apprehended, and are upon necessity slain therein, because they cannot be otherwise taken, it is no felony.' 08
This quote can best be understood in light of the fact that the
common law doctrine arose at a time when virtually all felonies
were punishable by death.' Felonies were considered inherently
dangerous criminal activity and exacted stern punishment."1 0
The concept of felony has its roots in the notion of forfeiture."'
106. Id. at 11. Apparently, the Garner Court does not make the important distinction
between the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon and the use of deadly force
in self-defense. Rather, the majority seems to find use of deadly force in self-defense as a
constitutional exception to their essential ban on the use of such force to apprehend a
fleeing felon. Penal codes, like the New York Penal Law, clearly distinguish between the
two contexts, prescribing varying degrees of use of force for self-defense and for police
apprehension. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 35.00-.35 (McKinney 1984).
107. 471 U.S. at 12-13.
108. 2 M. HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE 85 (1736).
109. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 465 (1899).
110. Id.
111. [Ihf we place ourselves in the first years of the thirteenth century some
broad statements seem possible. (i) A felony is a crime which can be prosecuted
by an appeal, that is to say, by an accusation in which the accuser must as a
general rule offer battle. . .(ii) The felon's lands go to his lord or to the king and
his chattels are confiscated. (iii) The felon forfeits life or member. (iv) If a man
accused of felony flies, he can be outlawed. Conversely, every crime that can be
prosecuted by appeal, and every crime that causes a loss of both lands and
goods, and every crime for which a man shall lose life or member, and every
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Blackstone wrote in his commentaries on the common law that:
[t]he idea of felony is indeed so generally connected with
that of capital punishment, that we find it hard to separate them; and to this usage the interpretations of the
law do now conform. And therefore if a statute makes
any new offense felony, the law implies that it shall be
punished with death, viz by hanging, as well as with
forfeiture. .. 12

The commentaries to the Model Penal Code explain that since
at common law "seizure" of a felony suspect using deadly force
was effected without the protection and formalities of an orderly
trial and conviction, the killing of a resisting felon was merely a
speedier means
by which to inflict the punishment merited by
3
the felon.'

1

The historical relationship between forfeiture of life and felonious crimes is unclear."" Pollock and Maitland note that the
age in which "felon" became a common word was the age in
which the tie of vassalage was the strongest tie that bound man
to man." 5 A vassal was a feudal tenant or grantee who was obligated to render feudal service, usually agrarian and military, to
the feudal lord.1 6 In turn, the tenant was granted a fief, or a
grant of land, upon which he and his family resided and tilled
7

the land."1

The Garner court considered the fact that the common law
doctrine developed during a time when weapons were crude by
today's standards." 8 Because of the crudity of available weapons, it was almost impossible to inflict deadly force except
through a hand-to-hand struggle, during which the safety of the
arresting officer was at risk."' Police officers began carrying
crime for which a fugitive can be outlawed, is a felony.
Id. at 466 (footnote omitted).
112. See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 98.
113. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07, comment 3, at 56 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). See
generally R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1098-1105 (3d ed. 1982).
114. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 465 (1899).
115. Id.
116. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1393 (5th ed. 1979).
117. Id.
118. 471 U.S. at 14.
119. Id.
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handguns only in the latter half of the last century.1 20 Only then
could deadly force be used at a distance. Today the use of such
force has an altogether different meaning, and harsher conse2
quences, as seen in the death of Edward Garner.1 '
Generally, early American jurisdictions followed the common law doctrine that a police officer may slay a fleeing felon
but not a fleeing misdemeanant. 122 In Holloway v. Moser,123 the
Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld that doctrine. 1 24 At
the time of the shooting in Moser the decedent had been sentenced to road labor after being convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor offense. 25 The decedent took
flight after a dynamite explosion.' 2 6 A guard for the work crew
ordered the decedent to halt, then shot and killed him. 27 The
assertion that the officer could not tell whether the decedent was
a felon or misdemeanant was no excuse, the court wrote. 2 s The
common law rule was justified because felons were considered
29
relatively more dangerous than misdemeanants.
There were states, however, that were cautious about accepting the doctrine. In State v. Smith, 30 the Supreme Court of
Iowa held that an officer may not use deadly force against a misdemeanant.' 3' When the officer reasonably believed that the suspect was engaged in a felonious crime, however (in Smith, attempting to effect the escape of a prisoner in police custody), a
jury must decide whether the use of deadly force was justified." 2
At the time of the shooting, the police officer had arrested the
decedent's father for drunkenness. 33 The decedent interfered,
allegedly to free his father, and as a result of the ensuing alter120

L. KENNEr & J. ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA 150-51 (1975).

121.

471 U.S. at 15.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 12.
193 N.C. 185, 136 S.E. 375 (1927).
Id. at 189, 136 S.E. at 379.
Id.
Id. at 187, 136 S.E. at 376.
Id. at 186, 136 S.E. at 376.
Id.
Id.
127 Iowa 534, 103 N.W. 944 (1905).
Id. at 537, 103 N.W. at 945.
Id. at 539, 103 N.W. at 945.
Id. at 535, 103 N.W. at 944.
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cation was fatally shot."' The officer asserted that the shooting
was in self-defense, and that, believing the decedent was committing a felony (attempting to effect a prisoner's escape), he
used necessary force to prevent it and arrest the decedent. 3 5
An early Tennessee decision, based on events which occurred nearly one century before Garner, followed the common
law's interest in protecting the misdemeanant. In Reneau v.
State, 36 the Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld the common
law doctrine, reasoning that it is better to let one convicted
merely of a misdemeanor escape, rather than take his or her
life. 3' It suggested that the doctrine be modified to proscribe
the use of deadly force against lower grade felons.'3 8 In Reneau
the decedent prisoner, Thomas, was convicted for assault and
battery.'3 9 En route to jail, he fled. 4 0 Neither the police officer,
Reneau, nor the accompanying guard gave chase, but rather
commanded Thomas to halt three times and when such command was not obeyed fired two shots, killing him instantly.14 1 In
his defense, Reneau argued that the prisoner had a violent temper and had threatened to escape. 42 In broad language, perhaps
meant to embrace the use of deadly force against felons, the
court wrote that:
Officers should understand that it is their duty to use
such means to secure their prisoners as will enable them
to hold them in custody without resorting to the use of
firearms or dangerous weapons, and that they will not be
excused for taking life in any case, where, with diligence
and caution, the prisoner could be otherwise held. 43
While North Carolina, Iowa, and Tennessee thus appear to
have relied on the common law doctrine to some extent,' 4" an
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 70 Tenn. 720 (1879).
137. Id. at 721.
138. Id.
139. Id. Despite the felonious nature of the charges, the Tennessee court characterized the decedent as a misdemeanant.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 722.
144. See also Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352 (1869); Roberts v. State, 14 Mo.
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early case in Texas rejected it. In Caldwell v. State'4 5 the court
found that a lower court's instruction directing the jury to consider evidence of the officer's desire to prevent the escape of the
decedent prisoner, and the non-violent character of the prisoner,
was proper.'" 6 The case involved one Lackey, who, with arrest
warrant in hand, sought the decedent Gilmore for the theft of
Lackey's two mules. 4 7 The defendant officer of the peace, Caldwell, along with Lackey and others, rode to the residence of Gilmore, where he arrested Gilmore without resistance while
Lackey cursed and abused the prisoner.'48 On departing from
the residence Gilmore broke from the group, and ran towards a
fence and a field of high grown cotton.'4 9 Perhaps confused, Gilmore then ran back toward his home and Caldwell fatally shot
him as he ran.' 50 The Texas court reasoned that while Gilmore
was a felony suspect, he was merely attempting escape, and was
neither armed nor violent. 15' It wrote that "[t]he law places too
high an estimate upon a man's life, though he be a poor, friendless prisoner, to permit an officer to kill him, while unresisting,
simply to prevent an escape."' 5
With regard to private citizens and the common law doctrine, courts held differently. In Storey v. State,'53 the Supreme
Court of Alabama found the common law doctrine unsound, and
decided instead to adopt a "safer" view, in which the use of
deadly force is not permissible against persons attempting "'secret' felonies, not accompanied by force." '' 54 In Storey, the defendant pursued the decedent to recover a horse the latter had
stolen. The defendant killed the horse thief and sought immunity under the common law doctrine, arguing that stealing the
138 (1851).
145. 41 Tex. 86 (1874).
146. Id. at 97.
147. Id. at 87.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 88.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 88-89.
153. 71 Ala. 329 (1882).
154. Id. at 339. The court fails to define "secret" felonies. Although the court addressed the issue of the use of deadly force by private citizens against felony suspects in
flight, the court's writing seems to apply to the use of deadly force by officers of the law
as well.
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horse was felonious, and killing the thief was necessary to recover the horse and terminate the larceny. 5 5 The court reasoned
that the defendant had had an opportunity to obtain redress at
law against the decedent, and therefore the killing was not
justified.

15

1

Similarly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held in
57
State v. Bryant1
that "extreme measures" may be taken to secure the arrest of suspects of capital felonies such as murder and
rape.158 When such measures are taken in cases involving felonies of a lesser degree, however, care must be taken that the use
of such force is necessary, and that no other method is available
to capture the suspect.5 9 In Bryant the defendant shot the decedent when he fled after being accused of stealing a hog from
the defendant's employer.16
The Garner majority conceded appellant's assertion that
the common law doctrine, authorizing police officers to use
deadly force to arrest fleeing felony suspects, prevailed when the
fourth amendment was adopted,"' and recalled that it has considered the common law in evaluating the reasonableness of police activity for fourth amendment purposes.1"2 Nevertheless, it
155. Id. at 338.
156. Id. at 340.
157. 65 N.C. 327 (1871).
158. Id. at 328.
159. Id.
160. Id. The butchered hog was later found at the decedent's home.
161. 471 U.S. at 12. The early cases show courts struggling with the doctrine however,
refusing to implement it fully. As seen in Smith, the Iowa court let the jury decide
whether use of deadly force was justified in the killing of the felon attempting to secure
his father's escape from police custody. Had the court adopted the common law doctrine
without reservation, the use of deadly force would have been justified.
While the decedent was a misdemeanant in Reneau, the Tennessee court seemed to
have had all escapees in mind, both felons and misdemeanants, when it ordered that
officers would not be excused for the taking of a life, if other means to prevent escape
could have been used. Finally, the cases involving private citizens suggest a general repugnance to the common law doctrine.
162. Id. Indeed, in United States v. Watson, the Court wrote that cases interpreting
the fourth amendment reflect the common law doctrine that police officers were permitted to arrest without warrant for felonies and misdemeanors committed in their presence
and for felonies not committed in their presence if there is probable cause to believe that
the suspect is the culprit. 423 U.S. 411, 418-19 (1976).
By similar reasoning, the Gerstein v. Pugh Court held that the fourth amendment
requires that prolonged restraint be supported by judicial determination of probable
cause. 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). The Court noted that the decision had historical support
in common law doctrine guiding interpretation of the fourth amendment. Id. At common
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was not constrained by early enforcement practices prevailing
when the fourth amendment was adopted. 163 The majority concluded that the appellant's reliance on the common law doctrine
as it prevailed at the time the fourth amendment was adopted is
an example of "mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of
a historical inquiry. 164 Rather than imply such literalism, the
purpose of historical inquiry is to focus on circumstantial inquiry in light of the Constitution.
In this regard, the Court noted that crimes previously punishable by death at common law are so no longer, thus "undermin[ing] the concept, which was questionable to begin with,
that use of deadly force against a fleeing felon is merely a speed65
ier execution of someone who has already forfeited his life.'
Moreover, it noted that the presumed distinction between the
not-so-dangerous misdemeanant and the dangerous felon is "untenable." Some misdemeanors, like drunken driving, are more
law a person was entitled to see a justice of the peace shortly after arrest, whereupon the
justice would decide if there was probable cause to restrain the suspect further. Id. at
114-15.
163. 471 U.S. at 13. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Court noted
that present legal contexts substantially differ from those surrounding the development
of common law rules of arrest. Id. at 591:
For example, whereas the kinds of property subject to seizure under warrants
had been limited to contraband and the fruits or instrumentalities of crime, see
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309, the category of property that may be
seized, consistent with the fourth amendment, has been expanded to include
more evidence. Warden v. Hayden, 287 U.S. 294 (1967). Also, the prohibitions of
the amendment have been extended to protect against invasion by electronic
eavesdropping of an individual's privacy in a phone booth not owned by him,
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), even though the earlier law had focused on the physical invasion of the individual's person or property interest in
the course of a seizure of tangible objects. See Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 428, 466 (1928).
445 U.S. at 591 n.33.
164. 471 U.S. at 13.
165. Id. at 14. For example, recently in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), the
Court held that the imposition of the death penalty was an excessive punishment for
robbery. Id. at 797. The Court focused on the petitioner's culpability, and the fact that
while the robbers he accompanied did commit murder, the petitioner did not kill nor
intend to kill. Id. at 798. It relied on its decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977),
where it held that the death penalty is an excessive punishment for the felony of rape,
and is prohibited by the eighth amendment as cruel and unusual punshment. Id. at 592.
The Coker plurality observed that only three states provide the death penalty for rape,
id. at 594, concluding that the lower court's judgment of death for rape is an anomaly,
which forces the Court to reject the penalty. Id. at 596.
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dangerous than some felonies.16 The majority concluded that
the Tennessee statute at issue, though a literal translation of its
common law pedigree, fails constitutionally in its comtemporary
application because of legal and technological changes." 7
STATE STATUTES AND POLICE PROCEDURE

The Garner majority ultimately considered police procedure
in individual jurisdictions. 8 No overwhelming trend away from
the common law rule was seen in the pertinent statutes of all
fifty states.' 6 9 Nineteen states have codified the rule, and two
state courts have significantly limited the statutes' applicability. 70 Michigan, Ohio, Virginia, and West Virginia have adopted
7
the common law rule through case law rather than legislation.' '
The Model Penal Code, which follows from the common law
rule, has been adopted by Hawaii and Nebraska. 7 ' Massachu166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 14 n.12.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
See supra note 3. See also
In California, police may use deadly force to arrest only if the crime for
which the arrest is sought was "a forcible and atrocious one which threatens
death or serious bodily harm" or there is a substantial risk that the person
whose arrest is sought will cause death or serious bodily harm if apprehension is
delayed.
Kortum v. Alkire, 69 Cal. App. 3d 325, 333, 138 Cal.Rptr. 26, 30-31 (1977), quoted in 471
U.S. at 16 n.15. "In Indiana, deadly force may be used only to prevent injury, the imminent danger of injury or force, or the threat of force. It is not permitted simply to prevent escape." Rose v. State, 431 N.E.2d 521 (Ind.App. 1982), quoted in 471 U.S. at 16
n.15.
171. Werner v. Hartfelder, 113 Mich. App. 747, 318 N.W.2d 825 (1982); State v. Foster, 60 Ohio Misc. 46, 59-66, 396 N.E.2d 246, 255-258 (Com.Pl. 1979); Berry v. Hamman,
203 Va. 596, 125 S.E.2d 851 (1962); Thompson v. Norfolk & W.R.Co., 116 W.Va. 705,
711-712, 182 S.E. 880, 883-84 (1935), cited in 471 U.S. at 16 n.16.
172. HAw. REV. STAT.. § 703-307 (1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1412 (1979), cited in 471
U.S. at 17 n.17. The relevant portion of the Model Penal Code provides:
The use of deadly force is not justifiable . . . unless (i) the arrest is for a felony;
and (ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer or is
assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to act as a peace officer;
and (iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of
injury to innocent persons; and (iv) the actor believes the (1) the crime for which
the arrest is made involved conduct including the use or threatened use of
deadly force; or (2) there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will
cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1968).
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setts has also adopted the Model Penal Code, with limitations
with regard to both private citizens and police officers.17
In eighteen other states the use of deadly force is only authorized "if the suspect has committed a felony involving use of
deadly force or threat of physical or deadly force, or is escaping
with a deadly weapon, or is likely to endanger life or inflict serious physical injury if not arrested.""74 Louisiana and Vermont
authorize use of deadly force only to prevent the commission of
violent felonies. 7 ' The remaining four states, Maryland, Montana, South Carolina, and Wyoming, have no relevant case law
or statutes, or have positions which are unclear.'76
Some states have recently expressed a desire to maintain
the common law rule, 177 yet in a significant minority of the
states movement
away from the common law doctrine is
17
apparent. 1
This apparent trend is more clearly evinced by the policies
adopted by police and other law enforcement departments,
which are "overwhelmingly . . .more restrictive than the com-

mon-law view."' 79 For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation authorizes use of firearms only when necessary to prevent
death or grievous bodily harm. 80 Similarly, the Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies limits accreditation to those departments which restrict use of deadly force to
situations where "the officer reasonably believes that the action
is in defense of human life . . .or in defense of any person in

immediate danger of serious physical injury."' 8 ' All indications
173. 471 U.S. at 17 n.17.
174. Id. See supra note 4.
175. LA.REV.STAT.ANN. § 14:20(2) (West 1974); VT.STAT.ANN., tit. 13, § 2305 (1974 &
Supp. 1984). "A Federal District Court has interpreted the Louisiana statute to limit the
use of deadly force against fleeing suspects to situations where 'life itself is endangered
or great bodily harm is threatened.' " Sauls v. Hutto, 304 F.Supp. 124, 132 (E.D.La.
1969), quoted in 471 U.S. at 17 n.19.
176. Id. at 17-18 n.20.
177. Id. at 18 n.21.
178. Id.
179. C. MILTON, J. HALLECK, J. LARDNER & G. ABRECHT, POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE
45-46 (Police Foundation 1977).
180. 471 U.S. at 18.
181. Program Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc.,
Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies: The Standards Manual for the Law Enforcement Agency Accreditation (Aug. 1983.).
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suggest that use of deadly force against felons is unnecessary
and therefore unjustifiable.18 2 Jurisdictions that have abandoned
the common law rule by legislation or police department policy
have not seen a concomitant increase in criminal activity.
Amici Curiae reported that
"[a]fter extensive research and consideration, [they] have
concluded that laws permitting police officers to use
deadly force to apprehend unarmed, non-violent fleeing
felony suspects actually do not protect citizens or law enforcement officers, do not deter crime or alleviate
problems caused by crime, and do not improve the crime
fighting ability of law enforcement agencies. "183
From the foregoing it is clear that states' interests in effective
law enforcement are not sufficient to warrant the use of deadly
force against suspected felons in flight.184
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

PROHIBITS USE OF DEADLY FORCE AGAINST UNARMED,
NONVIOLENT FLEEING FELONS

The Garner majority based its analysis of the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108 on case law under the
fourth amendment and the balancing of individuals' and states'
interests. Where individuals' and states' interests are considered,
the deciding issue is whether the totality of the circumstances
18 5
justifies a particular sort of seizure.
The opinion assumed as true that apprehension by use of
deadly force is a seizure, and therefore subject to the fourth
amendment's reasonableness requirements.8 " The majority considered other fourth amendment restrictions on police power to
seize, such as an individual's freedom to walk away,1 8 7 and concluded that restrictions on individuals' physical liberty at a spe182. Id.
183 Brief for Police Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in support of RespondentAppellee at 11, Garner, 471 U.S. 1.
184. 471 U.S. at 19. See generally id. at 10 n.10.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 7.
187. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). Compare United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (noting that it is not always clear when minimal police interference becomes a seizure).
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cific place, for a specific time, implicate a fourth amendment
analysis. Shooting an individual "seizes" his or her person,"' because physical liberty is severely restricted by the debilitating
effect of a gunshot wound."8 9 If the wound is fatal, the use of
such force permanently destroys all freedom of movement.' 90
While deprivation of life is generally a fifth amendment subject,' 9' the use of deadly force (or any other method of effectuating custody) causes a deprivation of freedom and the tenets of
the fourth amendment are invoked. 2
The majority also relied upon the premise that probable
cause is central to constitutional seizures.' 9 3 While recognizing
that the fourth amendment requires probable cause as a basis
for any lawful seizure, the majority found that this requirement
should be tempered by considering parties' competing interests
in the seizure context.' 94
It found that the manner of the seizure is of key importance
in balancing the two competing interests. 9 5 While the Justices
conceded that probable cause was not the sole determinant of
reasonableness, it remained a critical notion because it protects
the individual from unnecessary searches and seizures. In light
of Officer Hymon's strong belief that Garner was unarmed,' 96
and testimony that other means of seizure were available, 9 7 the
Court concluded that the seizure by deadly force was completely
188.

471 U.S. at 7.

189. "Seizure of an individual, within the Fourth Amendment, connotes the taking of
one physically or constructively into custody and detaining him, thus causing a deprivation of his freedom in a significant way, with real interruption of his liberty of movement." People v. P.A.J. Theater Corp., 72 Misc.2d 354, 356, 339 N.Y.S. 2d 152, 155
(N.Y.Crim.Ct. 1972), noted in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1219 (5th ed. 1979).
190. "No person shall...be deprived of... life, liberty or property. . .without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
191. Id.
192. "The right of the People to be secure in their persons... against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall, issue, but upon probU.S. CONST. amend IV.
able cause.
193. Id.
194. 471 U.S. at 8. So, for example, the Court referred to Place, 462 U.S. 696, in
which the government's interest in effective drug enforcement, while based on probable
cause, was insufficient to substantiate an intrusion on an indidividual's fourth amendment interest to be secure from unreasonable seizures. See supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.
195. 471 U.S. at 8.
196. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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unnecessary.
The notion of balancing competing individual and state interests compels the question of "whether the totality of the circumstances" of the seizure at issue justified the use of deadly
force.19 To begin to answer this question, the majority asserted
that the use of deadly force to seize a felon is unmatched in intrusiveness when compared with other forms of seizure. 9' 9 The
point needs little elaboration. Use of deadly force has the potential of immediately and permanently destroying all freedom of
physical movement, and life itself. Although an analogy may
perhaps be made between seizure by use of deadly force and lifelong imprisonment with its general restraint on physical freedom, the crucial distinction is that in the case of life imprisonment movement and activity are maintained, albeit in varying
degrees of quantity and quality, and life is not extinguished.
The majority rejected common law reasoning that the concept of "felony" lay in the idea of forfeiture of life, '00 and that
"the killing of a resisting or fleeing felon resulted in no greater
consequences than those authorized for punishment of the felony of which the individual was charged or suspected." '0 It
pointed to recent cases wherein crimes formerly punishable by
death no longer mandate such an onerous sentence, and that
such charges demonstrate a gradual undermining of common law
reasoning. 0 2 It concluded that the intrusion of a deadly seizure,
historically considered of no consequence because a captured
felon looked forward to certain execution, is no longer tenable.
Thus a suspect's fundamental interest in his own life cannot be
outweighed by states' interests in effective law enforcement.
The majority referred to numerous authorities to rebut appellant's argument that effective law enforcement requires resort
to deadly force, or the meaningful threat thereof. 0 3 The Court
noted "that laws permitting police officers to use deadly force to
apprehend unarmed, nonviolent, fleeing felony suspects actually
do not protect citizens or law enforcement officers, [and] do not
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

471 U.S. at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 13-14. See also id. at 13 n.11.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 comment 3(c)(i)(1962).
471 U.S. at 14. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
471 U.S. at 10.

HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
deter crime or alleviate problems caused by crime.

[Vol. IV
,,2o4

Hence, Edward Garner's death served absolutely no community
interest. Given that he was unarmed and apparently non-violent,
the use of deadly force was unnecessary, especially in the absence of probable cause that Garner posed a serious threat of
physical harm to Officer Hymon or others.20 5
Moreover, the majority assumed that the interest of both
the individual and society in the judicial determination of guilt
was frustrated by use of deadly force.2 6 Deadly force is self-defeating because it fails to recognize the purposes of the judicial
mechanism, and if such force finds its target, the mechanism
may not be activated at all.2"7 Judicial determination is in both
the private citizens' and states' interests. In the former, the private citizen needs a mechanism that will guarantee that his or
her constitutional rights are protected. In the latter, the states
need a mechanism that will support their efforts at law enforcement. Use of deadly force severely interferes with the administration of criminal justice.
The majority's analysis was strengthened by an overview of
pertinent statutes from all fifty American jurisdictions and pertinent police department policies, which indicated a long-term
movement away from the common law rule authorizing use of
deadly force against fleeing felons.20
The Tennessee statute at issue was subject to the fourth
amendment because the use of deadly force against a fleeing felony suspect is a seizure. The statute fails the probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment because it authorized Officer Hymon to shoot and kill fifteen year old Edward Garner,
despite the officer's determination that Garner was unarmed and
nonviolent. Probable cause to believe that Garner posed a serious physical threat to Hymon or others was never shown.20 9 The
statute fails the balancing test of the fourth amendment because
Garner's fundamental interest in his life was so vital as to out204. Brief for Police Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in support of RespondentAppellees at 11.
205. 471 U.S. at 21.
206. 471 U.S. at 10.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 18.
209. Id. at 21.
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weigh the State of Tennessee's interest in securing his capture
by any means necessary.10 The statute fails the reasonableness
standard of the fourth amendment because the manner of the
seizure authorized, use of deadly force-which abruptly and permanently destroyed a young life-so intruded on the person of
the suspect as to be completely unreasonable and wholly
unnecessary." 1'
DISSENT

The dissenting opinion,21 2 written by Justice O'Connor with
whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined, rejected the majority's reasoning. Justice O'Connor stated that the
majority obscured the issue at hand and she argued that the
"precise" issue was whether Officer Hymon's use of deadly force
under the circumstances of a residential burglary investigation
violated Garner's constitutional rights.2 13 The majority's misplaced emphasis on the validity of the Tennessee statute on its
face compelled entertainment of hypothetical facts with little
relevance to the problem posed by the facts on October 3, 1974,
O'Connor wrote.2
The dissent accepted two basic premises of the Court's
opinion: (1) that young Garner was seized for the purposes of
fourth amendment analysis; and (2) that deciding whether the
seizure was constitutionally proper requires a balancing of competing interests of the public and the suspect.21 5 From this point
on, however, decidedly opposing premises are relied upon in
evaluating the reasonableness of Officer Hymon's use of deadly
force to arrest burglary suspect Edward Garner. Unlike the majority opinion, the dissent qualified police resort to deadly force
as falling under the "rubric of police conduct . . . necessarily
[involving] swift action predicated upon on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat."" 6 Clarity of hindsight provided
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
(1968)).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

11.
20.
22.
25.

at 25-26.
at 26 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20
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a limited basis for which to examine the reasonableness of police
decisions made in uncertain and dangerous circumstances.217
This assumption was strengthened by the forceful argument
that residential burglary is a serious and dangerous crime that
concerns public interest in protecting not only private property
but also protecting individuals harmed by such intrusions.218
Citing Department of Justice reports, the dissent noted that
"[t]hree-fifths of all rapes in the home, three-fifths of all home
robberies, and about a third of home aggravated and simple as' '219
saults are committed by burglars.

Justice O'Connor contradicted the majority's assertion that
physical violence is rarely a part of burglaries in citing these re-

ports.220 It was noted that while a residential burglary, in hind-

sight, did not involve physical violence, the "potentialities for
violence" inherent in the forced entry into a home preclude the
characterization of the crime as "innocuous, inconsequential, minor, or 'nonviolent.' "221 Thus, the dissent challenged the majority's implied assertion that the Tennessee statute at issue was an
ill-considered adoption of the common law doctrine authorizing
use of deadly force to seize fleeing felons, asserting instead that
the statute codifies legislative determination that use of deadly
force in closely circumscribed contexts is quite justified because
public interest is being served.222
Justice O'Connor returned to the facts of October 3, 1974 to
review Edward Garner's respective interest under the fourth
amendment. She concluded that Hymon had probable cause to
arrest Garner that evening, based on the fact that as the Officer
217. Id.
218. Id. at 27.
219. Id. (quoting BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY 1
(January 1985)). But see id. at 27 n.23.
220. Id. at 21, 27.
221. Id. at 27 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 316 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting.)). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 131 comment g (1934)(burglary is among felonies that normally cause or threaten death or serious bodily harm); R. PERKINS & R.
BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1110 (3d ed. 1982) (burglary is a dangerous felony that creates
unreasonable risk of great personal harm).
222. 471 U.S. at 28. The dissent's conclusion was based on the presumed dangerous
nature of residential burglaries, and the dissent's concern in adequately representing the
extent of public interest involved in effective law enforcement. Adequate representation
of public interest, it was implied, was lacking in the majority's balancing of interests for
the purpose of the fourth amendment. Id. at 25-29.
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approached the back of the house he heard a door slam and saw
Garner run across the backyard to the chain-link fence.2" The
dissent recounted the now familiar and tragic decision young
Garner made: refusing to heed the Officer's warning, he attempted to escape over the fence."2 " This conclusion was based
on the assumption that the fifteen-year-old consciously decided
to take the risk, deliberately forfeiting his fundamental interest
in his own life. Furthermore, the disputed contention that the
Officer believed the only way to seize Garner was by use of
deadly force was accepted without question.22 6
Rather than weigh young Garner's interest in his life against
the public's interest in apprehending a suspect who was neither
armed nor violent, as the majority did, the dissent concluded
that Garner's interest did not encompass "a right to flee unimpeded from the scene of a burglary.

'12

This assertion was sup-

ported, the dissent believed, by the language of Tenn.Code Ann.
§ 40-7-108 (1982), which was interpreted as adequately accommodating a suspect's interests in such circumstances because it
was in the suspect's power to avoid risk of life or grievous harm
by heeding officers' warnings to halt.22
In conclusion, the dissent found that a "proper" balancing
of the circumstances, considering the dangerous nature of residential burglaries along with the determination that the suspect's interests did not encompass the right to flee unimpeded
from the scene of the burglary, demonstrated that Officer
Hymon's use of deadly force against Edward Garner was not unreasonable, and therefore was not prohibited by the fourth
amendment.

28

223. Id. at 3, 24.
224. Id. at 24.
225. Id. But see supra notes 28-29, and note 34.
226. Id. at 29.
227. Id. at 29. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982) read: "If, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the
necessary means to effect the arrest."
228. The dissent also noted:
that no other constitutional provision supports the decision below. In addition to
his fourth amendment claim, appellee-respondent also alleged violations of due
process, the sixth amendment right to trial by jury, and the eight amendment
proscription of cruel and unusual punishhment . . . Whatever the validity of
Tennessee's statute in other contexts, I cannot agree that its application in this
case resulted in a deprivation "without due process of law".
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CONCLUSION

Two months after Garner was decided the Tennessee statute was rewritten to accommodate the Supreme Court's holding.22 9 The new statute restricts the use of deadly force to situations in which a police officer has probable cause to believe that
the suspect has committed a felony involving the infliction or
the threatened infliction of serious physical harm to the officer
or others, or a police officer has probable cause to believe that
the suspect poses a significant threat of physical harm to himself, herself, or others. 30 Moreover, the use of deadly force must
be preceded by a warning and all other means of apprehension
must be exhausted before its use.'
Notwithstanding such guidelines, the re-written Tennessee
statute continues to authorize the killing of fleeing felony suspects. Under the new statute officers retain vast discretion with
regard to determining whether the suspect has committed a felony involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious
physical harm and whether the suspect is dangerous. 32 Such
Cf. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144-145 (1979).
Nor do I believe that a criminal suspect who is shot while trying to avoid
apprehension has a cognizable claim of a deprivation of his sixth amendment
right to trial by jury. See Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F.Supp. 1072, 10751076 (W.D. Tenn. 1971)(three judge court). Finally, because there is no indication that the use of deadly force was intended to punish rather than to capture
the suspect, there is no valid claim under the eighth amendment.See Bell v.
Wofish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-539 (1979).
Id. at 30-31.
229. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1985): Resistance to officer. (a) If, after notice of
the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flees or forcibly resists, the officer may
use all the necessary means to effect the arrest. (b) Notwithstanding subsection (a),
deadly force is authorized to effect an arrest only if all other reasonable means of apprehension have been exhausted, and, where feasible, warning has been given the defendant,
by identifying himself or herself as such officer, or an oral order to halt, or an oral warning that deadly force might be used, and: (1) The officer has probable cause to believe
defendant has committed a felony involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm to the officer or to any person in the presence of the officer; or (2) The
officer has probable cause to believe that the defendant poses a threat of serious physical
harm, either to the officer or to others unless he is immediately apprehended. (c) All law
enforcement officers, both state and local, shall be bound by the foregoing provisions and
shall receive instruction regarding implementation of same in law enforcement training
programs.
230. Id.
231 Id.
232. Id.
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discretion contradicts the spirit of Garner, for it invites a determination of probable cause for a seizure. As the majority held,
under a fourth amendment analysis involving the use of deadly
force to arrest fleeing felony suspects, an individual's interest in
life shall categorically outweigh the state's interest in securing
arrests of fleeing felony suspects.2 " The threat of serious physical danger to the officer or others aside, under Garner's fourth
amendment analysis the use of deadly force to secure a seizure
34
of a fleeing felony suspect is constitutionally unreasonable.
The use of deadly force is permissible only when the officer reasonably determines that the suspect poses a threat of serious
physical danger to himself, herself or others.2"
Moreover, officers maintain vast discretion with regard to
exhausting alternative means of arrest." 6 The statute does not,
for example, specifically compel an officer to give chase. Rather,
the statute's language suggests that a police officer may shoot a
fleeing felony suspect should he or she surmise that the suspect
will evade capture. " In Garner, Officer Hymon shot Edward
Garner in the back as the youth attempted to scale a chain-link
fence.2" The new statutory provisions authorize such killing as
long as the officer believes that no other means of arrest are
available. " 9
Use of deadly force in self-defense does not fall under the
purview of the fourth amendment, notwithstanding language in
the Garner holding.2 40 Fourth amendment scrutiny is required
only when deadly force is used as a method of seizure. Otherwise, use of deadly force in self-defense is proscribed by state
penal codes.2 ' A statute strictly in accordance with the Garner
holding must prohibit all use of deadly force to seize fleeing fel233.

471 U.S. at 11.

234.

Id.

235.

Id.

236.

See supra note 229 and accompanying text.

237. Id.
238.

471 U.S. at 4.

239.

See supra note 229 and accompanying text.

240.

471 U.S. at 11.

241.

See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL

LAW

§ 35.00-.30 (McKinney 1984).
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ony suspects unless the officer has probable cause to believe that
the suspect poses a significant threat to either himself, herself or
others.
Georgia McMillen

